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INTRODUCTION 
Cell phones play an ever-expanding role in the lives of cell users and in the 
functioning of modern society.1 They are used to browse the Internet, send/receive 
emails and texts, purchase goods online, provide directions, store and play music; 
they serve as planners, calendars, dictionaries, encyclopedias, and more. In many 
respects, their utility has made them a necessity. A person who wishes to partake in 
the social, cultural, and business affairs of society has no realistic choice but to use 
a cell phone.2 Consequently, cell phones accompany their users wherever they 
go—business offices, entertainment venues, vacations, places of religious worship, 
and the homes of friends and family.3 
As cell phone users move about in their daily lives, phone in hand or pocket, 
their cell phones communicate their locations to the cell service providers. These 
communications generate cell site location information (“CSLI” or “location 
data”). Prospective CSLI provides real-time cell phone locations and historical 
CSLI reveals past cell phone locations. This article considers the privacy 
implications of historical CSLI. 
Historical CSLI has vast privacy implications because the government 
frequently compels cell service providers to disclose this trove of information to aid 
in surveillance and investigations. Law enforcement agents mine through historical 
location data looking for evidence of a crime. But this practice of gathering and 
surveying historical CSLI extends to citizens beyond those subject to a criminal 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2014; B.A., Political Science, 
Kenyon College. 
1 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable 
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data that Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH L.J. 117, 126 (2012) (more than ninety-five percent of the United States population subscribed to 
a cell phone by the end of 2010). 
2 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site 
Information, 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
3 In re Application U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
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investigation. The government regularly analyzes the historical CSLI of innocent 
parties—friends, associates, neighbors, and complete strangers who happen to pass 
by a cell tower at a given time. Permeating surveillance such as this brings to mind 
images of George Orwell’s Big Brother Government, or Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon prison architecture and its coercive social power envisioned by Michel 
Foucault.4 In addition to the breadth of this practice, historical CSLI surveillance 
creates an unparalleled intrusion into the private life of the person whom the 
government targets. 
Unlike other surveillance techniques, historical CSLI does not reveal details 
from a single moment in time—a single trip, a single phone number dialed on the 
telephone, or a single stakeout—its scope and utility is much broader. “[N]o single 
journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a day in 
the life and a way of life, nor the departure from a routine that, like the dog that did 
not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, may reveal even more.”5 In the digital age, 
cell phones are artists, CSLI their canvas, and the movements of cell users their 
palette—the finished product being an intimate portrait of each cell user’s life. 
Despite historical CSLI surveillance’s pervasive and invasive qualities, courts 
regularly permit law enforcement agencies to obtain location data without first 
establishing probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment.6 Courts do this 
by holding that historical CSLI falls within the purview of the federal Stored 
Communications Act7 or that the government’s use of the data does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment. In holding that historical CSLI surveillance 
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment, these courts rely on two classic Fourth 
Amendment exceptions—the third-party exception and the public exposure 
exception—to rule that a cell user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
historical CSLI.8 
                                                          
4 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 164–73 (discussing the works of each author). See United 
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“1984 may have 
come a bit later than predicted, but it’s here at last.”); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1950). See MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (2d ed. 1995); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995) (1787). 
5 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
6 See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of Law, 
Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 690–91 (2011); Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of 
Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1745, 1755–58 (2009). 
7 Electronic Comm. Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C §§ 2701–2711 (2006). See also 
Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1755–58. 
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This article furthers the general position that the government’s use of 
historical CSLI for surveillance implicates the Fourth Amendment. In making this 
argument, this article refutes the applicability of these Fourth Amendment 
exceptions and highlights the novel theory several courts have adopted to hold that 
the Fourth Amendment does apply.9 Finally, in light of the unparalleled intrusion 
created by historical CSLI surveillance, this article stresses the need to reevaluate 
the approach underlying the exceptions, which treats secrecy as a prerequisite for 
privacy.10 
I. THE TECHNOLOGY OF CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
A. Types of CSLI 
CSLI refers to the data generated by communications made between cell 
phones and cell sites.11 Cell sites are transmitting devices that form a cell network 
and they are usually located on cell towers.12 Cell service providers strategically 
spread cell sites throughout their geographic coverage area.13 Service providers 
record various types of CSLI.14 
As a person travels with her cell phone, the phone’s signal shifts from cell site 
to cell site to receive the best signal.15 To maintain the strongest signal, a cell 
phone continuously and automatically registers itself with the closest cell site every 
seven seconds.16 This process generates registration data.17 When a cell user begins 
and ends a call, the cell phone generates initiation and termination data—that is, a 
record of the closest cell site when the call starts and finishes.18 During a call, the 
cell phone creates duration data.19 This data reflects the communications that the 
                                                          
9 See infra Parts IV and V. 
10 See infra Conclusion. 
11 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 702–03. 
12 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 126. 
13 Id. See also Freiwald, supra note 6, at 702. 
14 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 128. 
15 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 702–03; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 127–28. 
16 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 702–03; Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1752. 
17 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 705–06; Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1752–53. 
18 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 703–04. 
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cell phone had with cell sites throughout the call.20 For example, if a cell user 
changes locations while on a call, duration data reveals the various cell sites that 
the phone communicates with as it moves through the network.21 Cell service 
providers store historical CSLI for diagnostic, billing, and other purposes; and they 
generally retain each subscriber’s location data for at least one year.22 
B. CSLI Precision 
The precision with which CSLI pinpoints a cell phone—and cell user—
depends on the proximity of the cell sites to each other.23 The closer together the 
cell sites, the more precise the reading.24 To compensate for the higher number of 
active cell users, densely populated areas generally contain a greater number of cell 
sites spaced closer together than do rural areas.25 Service providers are constantly 
adding more cell sites to their networks.26 The current distribution of cell sites 
enables CSLI to pinpoint a cell user’s location with nearly the same precision as 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) technology.27 
Methods such as triangulation and sector-identification also improve the 
locating precision of CSLI.28 Analysts can triangulate the position of a cell user by 
using a mathematical equation that considers data from overlapping cell towers and 
changes in strength of communication signals.29 Triangulation locates a cell user 
with the accuracy of GPS technology.30 Sector-identification refers to determining 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Allie Bohm, How Long Is Your Cell Phone Company Hanging On To Your Data?, ACLU 
(Sept. 28, 2011, 10:17 AM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty/how-long-your-cell-
phone-company-hanging-your-data. 
23 Id. at 710–11; Brian Davis, Prying Eyes: How Government Access to Third-Party Tracking 
Data May be Impacted by United States v. Jones, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 843, 850 (2012) (“The precision 
of the cell phone user’s location directly correlates with the cell-site size.”). 
24 Davis, supra note 23, at 850. 
25 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 710. 
26 Id. (“With providers adding towers to their networks all the time, tower proximity in any 
particular place should be increasing.”); Davis, supra note 23, at 850 (“The number of cell sites in the 
United States has tripled over the last decade. . . .”). 
27 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2010); see In re 
Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 
849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (D. Md. 2011). 
28 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 711–12. 
29 Id. at 712–13. 
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the sector of a cell tower with which a cell phone communicated.31 By identifying 
the particular sector, the cell user’s location can be narrowed by one-third.32 
Finally, as technology improves so too will the precision with which CSLI 
pinpoints cell users.33 As one court stated: “The inexorable combination of market 
and regulatory stimuli ensures that cell phone tracking will become more precise 
with each passing year.”34 
II. POLICE USE OF CSLI 
CSLI surveillance has increased exponentially in a very short amount of 
time.35 Between 2008 and 2012, Sprint received nearly 200,000 requests for 
location data.36 A congressional subcommittee report from 2010 estimated that the 
total number of electronic surveillance orders issued at the federal level exceeded 
10,000 per year.37 The rise in CSLI surveillance is a representative of the 
government’s increasing requests for all types of cell data.38 Law enforcement 
requests for cell data—including but not limited to CSLI—have increased between 
twelve to sixteen percent annually.39 In response to a 2012 congressional inquiry, 
cell service providers reported that they handled 1.3 million demands for subscriber 
                                                          
31 Id. at 711. 
32 Id. 
33 In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified 
Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 534 (D. Md. 2011). 
34 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
35 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 121; Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-
uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
36 Chris Soghoian, Tuesday: Federal Appeals Court Hears Important Cell Phone Tracking Case, 
ACLU (Oct. 1, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/ 
tuesday-federal-appeals-court-hears-important-cell. 
37 Scott A. Fraser, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New Proposal for 
Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 574 (2012). 
38 Interestingly, as cell surveillance has increased, the number of warrants issued for wiretaps has 
decreased. Lichtblau, supra note 35 (“The diverging numbers suggest that law enforcement officials are 
shifting away from wiretaps in favor of other forms of cell tracking that are generally less legally 
burdensome, less time consuming and less costly.”). 
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information in 2011 alone.40 AT&T fielded roughly 700 requests per day; and 
Sprint received 1,500 requests per day.41 
The rise in CSLI surveillance can largely be attributed to its effectiveness as 
an investigatory tool.42 Prospective CSLI proves invaluable during emergencies 
such as child abductions and suicide calls.43 In one instance, police used 
prospective location data to find a stabbing victim who was in a basement hiding 
from the attacker.44 Equipped with prospective CSLI, U.S. Marshals now find 
fugitives in approximately two days, down from forty-two days.45 Among many 
other functions, historical CSLI allows the government to place a target at the scene 
of a crime;46 undermine a suspect’s alibi;47 or show a pattern of movements that, 
when viewed in the aggregate, evidence criminal activity.48 In addition, CSLI 
allows authorities to allocate resources more effectively and cost-efficiently, and 
reduce unnecessary risks.49 
Needless to say, CSLI is a valuable weapon that produces real-life benefits.50 
Law enforcement agents have gone as far as to suggest that its benefits outweigh 
any legal questions.51 Reasoning like this calls to mind Justice Brandeis’s 
admonition that “[e]xperience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the government’s purposes are beneficent.”52 
                                                          
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 120–21; Fraser, supra note 37, at 574. 




45 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 120. 
46 Id. at 119–20. 
47 Briana Schwandt, Is the Government in My Pocket? An Overview of Government Location 
Tracking of Cell Phones under the Federal System and in Montana, 72 MONT. L. REV. 261, 263 (2011). 
48 See infra Parts IV-B and Part V. 
49 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 1, at 120; Courtney E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the 
Loss of Something a Lot Like Privacy: An Examination of the “Mosaic Theory” and the Limits of the 
Fourth Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 171 (2012). 
50 Lichtblau, supra note 43. 
51 Id. 
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Historical CSLI surveillance is an abusive surveillance practice when 
unchecked. Law enforcement agents regularly conduct “dragnet surveillance” by 
compelling a service provider to turn over the CSLI of every cell user whose phone 
communicated with a cell site at a particular time.53 The government then mines 
that data, which may include the CSLI of hundreds or thousands of cell users, to try 
to figure out who was involved with the crime.54 The government also actively 
targets and scrutinizes the historical CSLI of friends or associates of persons under 
criminal investigation.55 For instance, in one case the government sought the 
historical CSLI of a woman allegedly associated with the criminal suspect, though 
she herself was not a suspect in the investigation.56 
Without a probable cause warrant requirement providing a detached judiciary 
to oversee the use of this intrusive technology, the only impediment to abuse is 
governmental abstention.57 The Supreme Court has historically rejected self-
restraint as a reason for permitting government conduct: “[T]his Court has never 
sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find 
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least 
intrusive means consistent with that end.”58 
III. RELEVANT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”59 As indicated by its language, the Fourth Amendment applies when 
                                                          
53 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 723; see also Lichtblau, supra note 35 (describing cell tower 
“dump[s]” as being when a police agency requests the CSLI of all cell subscribers who were near a cell 
tower at a certain time). 
54 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 723; Lichtblau, supra note 35; see also Declan McCullagh, ACLU: 
FBI Used ‘Dragnet’-Style Warrantless Cell Tracking, CNET (June 22, 2010, 9:37 AM), http:// 
news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20008444-281.html (“[T]he government obtained information that could 
be used to track the movements and locate the whereabouts at specific times of up to 180 people.”). 
55 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 723; see also id. n.258 (describing common practice where 
government agents seek the CSLI of persons with whom the target communicates). 
56 In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Comm. Serv. to Disclose Records to the 
Gov’t, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 588 n.11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (noting that government had provided “no 
specific information connecting these two individuals, or connecting the Criminal Suspect to the cell 
phone.”); see also Freiwald, supra note 6, at 692. 
57 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 720–21. 
58 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967). 
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there has been a search or seizure.60 To determine whether there has been a search, 
the court asks whether an individual has an expectation of privacy that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.61 This test traces back to Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence half a century ago in Katz v. United States.62 
The Katz test was believed to have completely replaced the trespass test from 
Olmstead.63 In United States v. Jones, however, the Supreme Court clarified that, in 
fact, the reasonable expectation of privacy test only augmented the trespass test.64 
Despite the reemergence of the trespass test, the Jones court made clear that 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without 
trespass [remain] subject to Katz analysis.”65 Therefore, this article reviews the 
constitutionality of historical CSLI surveillance under the Katz reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. 
The courts that have ruled that historical CSLI surveillance does not implicate 
the Fourth Amendment have relied on two classic Fourth Amendment exceptions 
to hold that cell users possess no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI.66 
These exceptions are the third-party exception and the public exposure exception. 
Underlying both of these exceptions is the notion that secrecy is a prerequisite for 
privacy.67 
A. Third-Party Exception 
In United States v. Miller,68 the government compelled two banks to disclose 
all of the defendant’s account records.69 The Supreme Court considered whether 
the disclosure of a customer’s bank records constituted a Fourth Amendment 
                                                          
60 Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1760. 
61 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
62 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
63 Id. at 352–53 (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead [have been] so eroded by our 
subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as 
controlling.”). 
64 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012). 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); United 
States v. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 
(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012); United States v. Forest, 
355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
67 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
68 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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search.70 The Court held that there had been no search, as the defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information in question.71 The defendant 
lacked an expectation of privacy in the information because “[a]ll of the documents 
obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips, contain[ed] only 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in 
the ordinary course of business.”72 In disclosing this information to a third party, 
the defendant assumed the risk that the government could access those records 
without a warrant.73 
In Smith v. Maryland,74 the government had the telephone company install a 
pen register to record the numbers dialed from the petitioner’s telephone.75 The 
Supreme Court examined “whether the installation and use of a pen register 
constitute[d] a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”76 The Court 
rejected the petitioner’s claim that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
regarding the number he dialed on his phone.77 Therefore, no search had been 
conducted.78 The Court reasoned that the petitioner “voluntarily conveyed 
numerical information to the telephone company and exposed that information to 
its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”79 The petitioner assumed the risk 
that those records would be revealed to the police.80 In its analysis, the Court also 
noted the limited intrusiveness of the government’s activity: “Neither the purport of 
any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, 
nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”81 
                                                          
70 Id. at 439–40. 
71 Id. at 442. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 443. 
74 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
75 Id. at 735. See also Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1762 (“A pen register is a device that records 
the numbers dialed from a particular phone.”). 
76 Smith, 442 U.S. at 736. 
77 Id. at 742. 
78 Id. at 745–46. 
79 Id. at 744. 
80 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
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B. Public Exposure: The Beeper Cases 
In United States v. Knotts,82 government agents attached a radio beeper to a 
container of chemicals stored in the defendant’s automobile.83 The agents then 
followed the automobile on public streets and highways.84 The Court held that the 
beeper monitoring did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, as “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”85 Through his 
public movements, the defendant “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to 
look” his progress and route.86 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reserved the 
question of whether a warrant would be required in a case involving twenty-four 
hour surveillance.87 
One year later in United States v. Karo,88 the Court considered similar facts as 
Knotts but reached the opposite conclusion; thereby limiting its holding in Knotts. 
Unlike in Knotts, the beeper in Karo was used to locate the targeted item within a 
private residence.89 Thus, the Court addressed whether the monitoring of a beeper 
in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violated the Fourth 
Amendment.90 The Court held that the government’s monitoring of the beeper did 
constitute a search, citing to the reasonable expectation of privacy existing in 
private residences.91 The beeper surveillance impinged on this expectation because 
it revealed, “that the beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been 
visually verified.”92 
                                                          
82 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
83 Id. at 278. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 281. 
86 Id. at 281–82. 
87 Id. at 283–84; see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556–58 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(citing other courts that have recognized the limited scope of the Knotts holding). 
88 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
89 Id. at 708–10 (describing facts of case). 
90 Id. at 713. 
91 Id. at 714–15. 





F O U R T H  A M E N D M E N T  E X C E P T I O N S  
Volume XIII – Spring 2013 ● ISSN 1087-6995 (print) 2164-800X (online) 










Together, Knotts and Karo stand for the general proposition that the 
government may use a tracking device to ascertain an individual’s location in 
public but not in a private.93 
IV. DISTINGUISHING CSLI—WHY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
EXCEPTIONS DO NOT APPLY 
A. Distinguishing Miller and Smith 
Courts have used the Miller/Smith third-party exception to hold that cell users 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI.94 Just as the defendant in 
Smith voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the phone company by 
dialing phone numbers and the defendant in Miller by giving documents to the 
bank, so too does the cell user voluntarily convey her CSLI to the service provider 
by using a cell phone.95 Accordingly, the government’s acquisition of a cell user’s 
historical CSLI does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The argument that a cell user voluntarily conveys CSLI to the service 
provider mischaracterizes the process by which cell phones generate CSLI, and 
does not consider the qualitative difference in information revealed by CSLI as 
compared to other surveillance practices. The defendant in both Miller and Smith 
unquestionably conveyed the information at issue.96 One gave documents to a bank 
employee and the other dialed numbers on a telephone.97 A cell phone user, 
however, “has not knowingly exposed or voluntarily conveyed [CSLI] to the 
provider, as those phrases are ordinarily understood.”98 Unlike the conveyances in 
                                                          
93 In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communications Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 613 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Suarez-Blanca, 2008 WL 4200156 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008); United 
States v. Benford, 2010 WL 1266507 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010). 
95 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 843–44 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
(discussing government’s arguments for granting CSLI disclosure); see also Brief for the United States, 
at 15–23, In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/GovOpeningBrief.pdf. 
96 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
97 See supra Part III-A (briefing Miller and Smith); see also Brief for American Civil Liberties 
Union Foundation et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site 
Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (No. 11-20884), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/ 
assets/5th_circuit_cell_phone_tracking_amicus_brief_texas.pdf. 
98 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 845; see also Freiwald, supra note 6, 
at 736 (“Cell phone users do not voluntarily, actively, and knowingly convey location data to 
providers.”); Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1785 (“Because CSLI is conveyed without user intervention, 
proponents of probable cause contend that the [third party] doctrine—which depends upon individuals 
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Miller and Smith, CSLI is an automatic byproduct of cell phone use and design.99 
To turn on the phone or make or receive a call, cell users do not enter their zip 
code, area code, or other location identifiers; nor do any of the digits they press 
reveal their location.100 
The facts of United States v. Forest101 illustrate one example of the lack of 
control cell phone users have over the creation of CSLI. In Forest, law enforcement 
agents dialed the defendant’s phone but hung up before the phone rang.102 The call 
still caused the defendant’s phone to generate CSLI, which the agents then used to 
track his movements.103 The court correctly concluded that the user had not 
voluntarily conveyed the CSLI—the agent, not the defendant, called the phone 
causing it to generate CSLI.104 
Historical CSLI surveillance is also a substantially more intrusive practice 
than the practices at issue in Miller and Smith. The Court in Smith explicitly noted 
the limited intrusion created by the pen register.105 By contrast, historical CSLI 
surveillance records the cell user’s movements over a prolonged period of time, 
revealing travels, activities, and associations.106 As Magistrate Judge Smith in the 
Southern District of Texas incisively observed: “If the telephone numbers dialed in 
Smith v. Maryland were notes on a musical scale, the location data sought here is a 
grand opera.”107 
B. Distinguishing Knotts and Karo 
Courts have reasoned that CSLI locates users only imprecisely, thereby 
avoiding the privacy interests of the home at issue in Karo.108 Implicit in this 
position is the belief that CSLI can never reveal an individual’s presence or 
                                                          
99 See supra Part I (describing different types of CSLI); see also Brief for American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation et al., supra note 97, at 39 (“[Cell users] do not communicate their location 
to the cell phone company of their own volition.”). 
100 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 844. 
101 United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 2004). 
102 Id. at 947. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 951. 
105 See supra Part III-A (discussing Smith). 
106 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 839 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
107 Id. at 846. 
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movements in places shielded from public view.109 In adhering to Knotts’ general 
principle, the courts reason that cell phone users have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy as they move from one public place to another, much as the defendant in 
Knotts had no expectation of privacy while traveling on public streets and 
highways.110 These arguments are based on outdated assumptions and ignore the 
substantial intrusion permitted by historical CSLI. 
The position that CSLI surveillance does not implicate the privacy interests 
stated in Karo is based on “yesteryear’s assumption that [CSLI locates] users only 
imprecisely.”111 Cell site technology—microcells, triangulation, and sector 
identification—can now reveal a cell phone user’s location with nearly the same 
precision as GPS data.112 Anyone who has used Google Maps knows that GPS data 
can easily pinpoint a particular street address.113 Moreover, as service providers 
continue to increase the number of cell sites in their network, CSLI will locate cell 
phones with greater precision.114 In addition to the technological aspects, the ability 
to infer greatly enhances the precision of CSLI.115 For example, by comparing 
CSLI with common sleep hours one would likely be able to determine when a cell 
user was at home.116 For the foregoing reasons, it is simply incorrect that CSLI can 
never reveal “whether a particular article—or a person, for that matter—is in an 
individual’s home at a particular time.”117 
The simplistic argument that historical CSLI surveillance amounts to 
following a person moving in public ignores the fundamental difference in the 
intrusion created by this practice.118 In Knotts, the tracking was limited to a single 
                                                          
109 See id. at 837 (citing Brief for the United States at 34–35, 2009 WL 3866618 (Feb. 13, 2009); 
see also Freiwald, supra note 6, at 729; Chamberlain, supra note 6, at 1787–88). 
110 See supra Part III-B (discussing Knotts). 
111 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 837. 
112 See supra Part I (regarding CSLI technology); see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 
747 F. Supp. 2d at 837; Freiwald, supra note 6, at 710–13 (discussing precision of triangulation and 
sector identification). 
113 Freiwald, supra note 6, at 713–14 (regarding the precision of GPS data). 
114 See supra Part I. 
115 See Freiwald, supra note 6, at 724–25. 
116 Id. at 724–25; see also id. n.268 (“[This] would show the telephone on in the same place for 
long periods (for example, sleeping hours) that would correspond to the time the target was home.”). 
117 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984). 
118 See Freiwald, supra note 6, at 730 (“An attempt to minimize the privacy intrusion that location 
data monitoring presents by analogizing it to bumper-beeper monitoring or even visual surveillance by 
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trip from one place to another.119 What the government learned during that trip was 
limited to what could be observed over the course of that trip.120 Historical CSLI 
surveillance, by contrast, reveals the totality and pattern of one’s movements 
twenty-four hours a day and over a period of weeks, months, or even years.121 
Prolonged surveillance like this is drastically different than the surveillance 
practice considered in Knotts.122 Unlike an individual’s movements during a single 
journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course of several months is not 
exposed in the same way.123 Although each individual movement may be exposed 
to the public, one’s aggregated movements tell a different story.124 
Together, United States v. Jones and the Jones retrial125 illustrate how the 
sequence of one’s movements reveals more than any one of its constituent parts, 
and historical CSLI’s ability to evidence that sequence. In Jones, the government 
tracked Jones’ movements for one month using a GPS device installed on the 
defendant’s vehicle.126 At trial, the government used the GPS data to show, not the 
location of the stash house or Jones’ movements over any one trip or even day, but 
the pattern of his movements to evidence his involvement in cocaine trafficking.127 
The government prosecutor said in his opening statement: “I want to . . . just show 
you an example of how the pattern worked. . . . The meetings are short. But you 
will again notice the pattern you will see in the coming weeks over and over 
again.”128 
The Supreme Court eventually ruled in Jones that the government’s attaching 
of the GPS device to Jones’ vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore 
excluded the evidence generated by the device.129 The Jones case is now on 
                                                          
119 See supra Part III-B (regarding Knotts). 
120 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838–39 (S.D. Tex. 2010). 
121 Id. at 839. See also supra Part I (discussing CSLI technology). 
122 See supra Part III-B (briefing Knotts). See also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. 
Supp. 2d at 838–39. 
123 See infra Part V. 
124 Id. 
125 See Sarah Roberts, Court Says No GPS Tracking? How About Cell Phone Tracking?, ACLU 
(Apr. 6, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/court-
says-no-gps-tracking-how-about-cell-phone. 
126 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
127 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
128 Id. 
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retrial.130 To supplant the excluded GPS data, the government has obtained five 
months worth of Jones’ CSLI.131 Tellingly, the government seeks to prove with 
CSLI the same pattern of movements gathered by the GPS device.132 
V. OF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE SUM OF 
ONE’S MOVEMENTS 
For the Fourth Amendment to have force in the digital age, the Fourth 
Amendment must accommodate the changes brought about by technology. Cell 
phones and the CSLI they generate have made possible a level of governmental 
intrusion previously inconceivable.133 The difference is not one of degree but of 
kind, for “the whole is something different than the sum of its parts.”134 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell 
a story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not 
visiting any of these places over the course of a month 
. . . a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little 
about a woman, but that trip followed a few weeks later 
by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A 
person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce 
whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a 
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient 
receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular 
individuals or political groups—and not just one such 
fact about a person, but all such facts.135 
Recognizing that cell users do not voluntarily convey or publicly expose these 
intimacies of life revealed by historical CSLI, several courts have held that the 
                                                          
130 Roberts, supra note 125. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 
809 F. Supp. 2d. at 126. 
134 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing KURT KOFFKA, 
PRINCIPLES OF GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 176 (1935)). 
135 In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (quoting United States v. 
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Fourth Amendment exceptions do not apply.136 In doing so, these courts adopted 
the “mosaic theory”137 to hold that society recognizes as reasonable an expectation 
of privacy in the totality of one’s movements.138 People do not expect their every 
movement, twenty-four hours a day and over a prolonged period of time, to be 
monitored.139 Nor do people reasonably expect that their movements “will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so 
on.”140 The intrusion historical CSLI surveillance makes into a person’s private life 
stands in stark contrast to the relatively brief intrusions made in Miller, Smith, and 
Knotts.141 Moreover, such an intrusion contradicts the Fourth Amendment, which 
“reflects a choice that our society should be one in which citizens dwell in 
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.”142 
The mosaic theory marks an important step toward fortifying the Fourth 
Amendment in the digital age. By focusing the analysis on the aggregation of one’s 
movements, this standard appropriately accounts for the new threats to individual 
privacy produced by historical CSLI surveillance. Moreover, this standard allows 
for meaningful consideration of these emerging threats to individual privacy by 
freeing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from the constraints imposed by the 
third-party and public exposure exceptions, and the all or nothing approach to 
privacy underlying them.143 
                                                          
136 See, e.g., In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (quoting 
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562); In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-
Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19. 
137 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562; see also Orin Kerr, What’s the Status of the Mosaic Theory After 
Jones?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/23/ 
whats-the-status-of-the-mosaic-theory-after-jones/. 
138 See, e.g., In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 
809 F. Supp. 2d at 118–19; In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 840 (S.D. Tex. 
2010). 
139 See In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. 
Supp. 2d at 118 (quoting Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing 
Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526 (D. Md. 2011); In re U.S. 
for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 839–40; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
140 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
141 See supra Part III. 
142 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 217 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. at 956 (discussing “the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power and to 
prevent a too permeating police surveillance.”). 
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The pervasive and invasive nature of historical CSLI surveillance implicates 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests. As indicated in the foregoing sections, there 
are sufficient differences with historical CSLI to clear the hurdles imposed by the 
Fourth Amendment exceptions.144 Nevertheless, there are courts that still apply the 
exceptions to conclude that a cell user has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
historical CSLI. The root cause of these courts’ decisions seems to be an adherence 
to the general notion imbedded within the Fourth Amendment exceptions—that 
secrecy is a prerequisite for privacy.145 
This approach fails to appreciate the unique attributes of modern society 
where “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties 
in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”146 Indeed, while CSLI may 
conceptually fit the paradigm of these exceptions—information is revealed to a 
third party and movements are exposed to the public—it also permits unparalleled 
intrusion, revealing drastically more intimate information than preceding 
surveillance techniques.147 By applying the exceptions to historical CSLI, the 
government may engage in surveillance that “alter[s] the relationship between 
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic society,” thereby 
contravening the purpose of the Fourth Amendment.148 As Justice Sotomayor 
stated in her concurrence in Jones, “[a]wareness that the Government may be 
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”149 
Of course technology will always outpace the level of protection afforded by 
the law. However, this does not justify confining the law’s protections to the evils 
of past decades. Courts today should embrace the spirit of Justice Brandeis dissent 
in Olmstead, where he wrote: “Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection 
against specific abuses of power, must have [the capacity to adapt] to a changing 
                                                          
144 See supra Part IV. 
145 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957. 
146 Id. 
147 See supra Part IV (detailing depth of intrusion created by CSLI surveillance); see also In re 
U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Info., 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Applying the third-party-disclosure doctrine to cumulative cell-site-location records 
would permit governmental intrusion into information which is objectively recognized as highly 
private.”). 
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world.”150 The Fourth Amendment’s efficacy in the digital age depends on, more 
than ever, the contemplation of not only what has been but of what may be.151 This 
can only happen if Fourth Amendment jurisprudence advances past the all or 
nothing approach to privacy rooted in the third-party and public exposure 
exceptions. 
                                                          
150 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
151 See Kylo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001) (“While the technology used in the 
present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems 
that are already in use or in development.”); see also In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing the Release of 
Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. at 126; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
